

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 075982
ORIGIN EB-08

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 USIA-06
TRSE-00 SOE-02 DOE-15 CIAE-00 COME-00 L-03 /047 R

DRAFTED BY EB/ITP/EWT:WAROOT:DLM
APPROVED BY EB/ITP:WBARRACLOUGH
EUR/NE:DGOODMAN
DOD/ISA:EFROST

-----116814 241050Z /16

R 240257Z MAR 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
INFO AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 075982

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: ESTC, SW

SUBJECT:CONTROLS ON EXPORTS FROM NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

REF: (A) STATE 43553, (B) STATE 60173, (C) STATE 70511

1. OFFICIALS FROM STATE AND DEFENSE MET WITH SWEDISH
AMBASSADOR WACHTMEISTER AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF, MATS
BERGQUIST AND ULF DINKELSPIEL, ON MARCH 22, LEAVING WITH
THEM NON-PAPER PER PARA 2A REF A AMENDED TO DELETE SECOND
SENTENCE PARA (8). DEPARTMENT ALSO COVERED ORALLY THE
POINTS ON THE ASEA CASE PER PARA 2B REF A.

2. WACHTMEISTER:

A. ASKED WHAT CHANGES WARRANTED A NEW U.S. APPROACH AND
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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 075982

WHETHER WE REGARDED THE PRESENT SYSTEM AS INADEQUATE AND
INTENDED TO TIGHTEN IT;

B. EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR U.S. LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN
THIS FIELD AND SWEDISH DESIRE TO TALK ABOUT ISSUES INFORMAL-
LY ("THE LESS WE FORMALIZE THE BETTER"; "A NON-ALIGNED
COUNTRY WITH A NEUTRAL FOREIGN POLICY CANNOT MAKE COMMIT-

MENTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES");

C. NOTED THAT THE SWEDISH POSSIBILITY TO CONTROL, MUCH LESS TO PROHIBIT, EXPORTS WAS LIMITED TO MUNITIONS;

D. RECOGNIZED THAT GOS HAS CLOSE CONTACT WITH INDUSTRY, TALKS ABOUT PROBLEMS, CAN PRESSURE AND DISCUSS, AND DESIRES TO LIMIT TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY BECAUSE OF ITS OWN INTERESTS (AS DO SWEDISH COMPANIES FOR THEIR OWN REASONS);

E. DESCRIBED ASEA AS AN ISOLATED CASE, MARKED BY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON BOTH SIDES WHICH SHOULD BE CLEARED UP.

3. DINKELSPIEL SAID:

A. HE BELIEVED THERE WAS NO U.S. TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED IN THE ASEA NUCON 400 (HE DID NOT MENTION PARTS) AND WE COULD ALWAYS DISCUSS SUCH MATTER ("WE'RE INTERESTED IN SORTING OUT IF THERE IS EMBARGOED U.S. TECHNOLOGY");

B. IF THERE ARE NO U.S. COMPONENTS, WE GET ON VERY TOUCHY GROUND;

C. DISCUSSION MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE BETWEEN U.S. COMPANIES EXPORTING TO SWEDEN AND SWEDISH IMPORTING COMPANIES;
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PAGE 03 STATE 075982

D. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FORMALIZE CHANNELS FOR DISCUSSIONS;

E. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO HEAR U.S. THINKING ON THE WHOLE QUESTION OF THE EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM.

4. STATE AND DEFENSE OFFICIALS COMMENTED DURING DISCUSSION:

A. NEW ELEMENTS IN U.S. APPROACH WERE PRIMARILY AN EVOLUTION TOWARD A MORE SELECTIVE SYSTEM WHICH MIGHT EMPHASIZE CONTROLS ON TECHNOLOGY MORE THAN ON END PRODUCTS, WITH NO OVERALL TIGHTENING ALTHOUGH SOME AREAS WOULD BE TIGHTENED AND OTHERS LOOSENED.

B. WE HAVE HAD EXCELLENT MILITARY RELATIONS, WITH A KEEN MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND SHARING OF PERSPECTIVES AND WE WANT THE SAME COOPERATION ON EXPORT CONTROLS.

C. THERE IS A NEED TO ASSURE TACIT LOW KEY COOPERATION ON EXPORT CONTROLS AND WE NEED TO KNOW CONCLUSIONS WHICH GOS AND SWEDISH COMPANIES ARRIVE AT INDEPENDENTLY.

D. DISCUSSIONS OF FACTUAL QUESTIONS SHOULD PROCEED AT

THE TECHNICAL LEVEL. WE WOULD FIND IT CONVENIENT FOR A
USG TECHNICIAN TO RESUME DISCUSSIONS ON ASEA WITH WHOMEVER
GOS AND ASEA PREFER. WE HAD THOUGHT SWEDISH COMPANIES
MIGHT PREFER TO CONSULT WITH GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL THAN
WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF U.S. COMPANIES BECAUSE OF CONCERNS
RELATING TO PROPRIETARY INFORMATION AND COMPETITIVE AD-
VANTAGE; BUT WE ARE FLEXIBLE ON THIS.

E. GOS VIEWS ON HOW BEST TO ARRANGE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE
APPRECIATED.

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PAGE 04 STATE 075982

5. WACHTMEISTER INDICATED THAT IT WOULD PERHAPS BE USEFUL
FOR THE GOS TO CONSULT WITH ASEA AGAIN.

6. IF SWEDISH EMBASSY DOES NOT INFORM DEPARTMENT WITHIN
A WEEK OR TWO OF PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR FURTHER DIS-
CUSSION ON ASEA, DEPARTMENT WILL INQUIRE WHAT THE SWEDISH
PREFERENCE IS. VANCE

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Message Attributes

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Concepts: NONALIGNED NATIONS, EXPORT CONTROLS
Control Number: n/a
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Draft Date: 24 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
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Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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